Secretary of State Rubio quantified the missile production asymmetry on 2 March: Iran produces "over 100 of these missiles a month" against "six or seven interceptors that can be built a month." Two weeks later, CENTCOM Admiral Cooper confirmed strikes shifted from neutralising launch threats to targeting Iran's "wider manufacturing apparatus." This article connects those two primary source statements and examines whether the production differential drove the strategy change. All figures are sourced to CENTCOM, IDF via Alma Center, and Israeli government procurement records. The analytical inference — that the arithmetic forced the phase transition — is the author's assessment, clearly distinguished from the sourced data.
Secretary of State Rubio quantified the missile production asymmetry on 2 March: Iran produces "over 100 of these missiles a month" against "six or seven interceptors that can be built a month." Two weeks later, CENTCOM Admiral Cooper confirmed strikes shifted from neutralising launch threats to targeting Iran's "wider manufacturing apparatus." This article connects those two primary source statements and examines whether the production differential drove the strategy change. All figures are sourced to CENTCOM, IDF via Alma Center, and Israeli government procurement records. The analytical inference — that the arithmetic forced the phase transition — is the author's assessment, clearly distinguished from the sourced data.