* There are axioms, there are models, and there are theorems.
* A model is a particular structure with objects and relationships. The "standard model of arithmetic" is just the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, ... with normal rules of addition and subtraction and so on. A different model could be the real numbers, or one that includes infinitesimally small numbers, or so on.
* A set of axioms are rules about how a model can work. For example, we can have an axiom for any set of objects called "numbers" with an operation called "addition" that the operation must be commutative (x+y = y+x). The standard model above is one model that satisfies this axiom.
* A theorem is a fact that can be true or false about a given model. For example, "the model has infinitely many objects." If we can prove a theorem from a set of axioms, then that theorem is true for every model that satisfies the axioms. However, there can also be theorems that are true for one model that satisfies the axioms but false for a different model.
Godel's completeness theorem says that if a theorem is true for every model that satisfies a set of axioms, then one can prove that theorem from the axioms.
Godel's first incompleteness theorem says that in any axiomatic system (sufficiently complex) there are theorems that are neither always true nor always false. In other words, there is a theorem that is true for some model of the axioms but false for some other model of the axioms.
Godel's completeness theorem can not be understood without bringing in first order logic, because it is a statement of the expressitivity of the language(relative to its semantics). Other more expressive languages, like second order logic (with its usual semantics) is not complete. Trying to explain Godel's completeness theorem without bringing in the language is a path to confusion.
And your explanation of the first incompleteness theorem is also at best confusing. I must preface this with the comment that your definition of a 'theorem' matches what is usually called a sentence or a statement, and a theorem is usually reserved for a sentence which is proven by a axiomatic system. If the axiomatic system is sound, all theorems will be true in all models. The question of completeness is whether or not all truths(aka sentences true in all models) can be proven(aka they are theorems). With this more common usage of the words, Gödel's incompleteness theorems show that every consistent theory containing the natural numbers has true statements on natural numbers that are not theorems of the theory (that is they cannot be proved inside the theory).
Your description of the first incompleteness theorem is also true for complete logics, even for propositional logic (with your definition of 'theorem' as actually meaning statement). It has statements which is true in some models and false in others. This does not make it incomplete.
That is interesting, I always thought that the incompleteness theorems says, there are theorems that are true or false in all models but cannot be proved to be so. But if it that is not the case and there always exist models where the theorem is true and false, that makes it sound to me, like the incompleteness theorem is not really about proving things. With that it sounds more like the inability of a sufficiently complex set of axioms to only admit isomorphic models, i.e. have all possible models agree on all expressible theorems. Makes the entire thing sound almost trivial, of course you can not prove what does not follow from the axioms.
Of all the incompleteness-style theorems, I find the Halting problem to be the most approachable and also the most interesting. Maybe it's because I'm a software dev that dabbles in math rather than the other way around. But that makes me wonder if all of Gödel's theorems can be stated if 'software form', so to speak.
Right, if you're a software engineer, the realization that the two theorems are nearly-equivalent really takes the air out of a lot of the existential philosophizing around Gödel's incompleteness.
Gödel's argument basically says that any system of mathematics powerful enough to implement basic arithmetic is a computer. This shouldn't be surprising to software engineers because the equivalency between Boolean logic and arithmetic is easy to show. And if you have a computer, you can build algorithms whose outcome can't be programmatically decided by other algorithms.
It's convenient that Henry Rice lived long before the age of language cults. I don't even think Rice wrote software, he's just a mathematician, he proved this nice property in mathematics. Stuff like FORTRAN and ALGOL happens later.
Also though, just as for the Halting Problem, we are always allowed a three-way split. Rice proves that "Has property" vs "Does not have property" can't be done, but "Has property" vs "Does not have property" vs "Shrug - I dunno, seems hard" is possible, and indeed easy if you're OK with lots of machines landing in the "Shrug" pile. You can expend as much work as you like to shrink that pile, Rice just proved it would need infinite work to empty it completely.
e.g. that Godel didn't think this scrapped Hilbert's project totally:
>Gödel believed that it was possible to redefine what we mean by a formal mathematical framework, or allow for alternative frameworks. He often discussed an infinite sequence of acceptable logical systems, each more powerful than the last. Every well-formulated mathematical question might be answerable within one of them.
That part you quoted was interesting to me too. I remember once re-reading the incompleteness theorems - where it talks about a "finite set of axioms", it seemed there may be a loophole if we can imagine a theoretically infinite set of axioms, as a way to approach completeness.
Overall I really enjoyed this article, short interviews with mathematicians and philosophers on a topic I've often thought about.
As far as I can see people always radically exaggerate the effect of the incompleteness theorems. It seems interesting that any nontrivial axiomatic system has statements which are true but unprovable but to say that derails Hilbert’s project seems just obviously untrue when you can for example join math postgrad programs now which are focused on formalisation. [1] So formalisation is very much still going on, probably more so now than ever given advances in theorem provers.
Yes there are undecidable statements (eg the continuum hypothesis) but that doesn’t change the fact that the vast vast majority of statements in any axiomatic system are going to be decidable, and most undecidable statements are going to have “niche” significance like that.
This is more like the popular lay take that are more or less confused about the meaning and implications of the theorems. The fact is that the implications are real yet more nuanced than this - something the article touched on.
Hilbert’s program was to reduce math to a finite set of axioms and was indeed derailed by incompleteness theorems(Gödel) and undecidability (Church, Turing).
Formalizing math with automated theorem provers has little to do with the goal of Hilbert program. Also they aren’t related to the foundational research that it entailed.
Also, as the article mentions, the implications as well as Gödel was largely misunderstood.
At the same time if you imagine a machine that can associate different maths. Would said machine encounter undecidable statements more frequently?
Would the rules of said machine have statements they themselves cannot prove by parameters set in their ‘programmed(by humans, machines, or other machines)’ assumptions?
> “incompleteness theorems” established that no formal system of mathematics — no finite set of rules, or axioms, from which everything is supposed to follow — can ever be complete.'
It's much easier than it seems.
* There are axioms, there are models, and there are theorems.
* A model is a particular structure with objects and relationships. The "standard model of arithmetic" is just the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, ... with normal rules of addition and subtraction and so on. A different model could be the real numbers, or one that includes infinitesimally small numbers, or so on.
* A set of axioms are rules about how a model can work. For example, we can have an axiom for any set of objects called "numbers" with an operation called "addition" that the operation must be commutative (x+y = y+x). The standard model above is one model that satisfies this axiom.
* A theorem is a fact that can be true or false about a given model. For example, "the model has infinitely many objects." If we can prove a theorem from a set of axioms, then that theorem is true for every model that satisfies the axioms. However, there can also be theorems that are true for one model that satisfies the axioms but false for a different model.
Godel's completeness theorem says that if a theorem is true for every model that satisfies a set of axioms, then one can prove that theorem from the axioms.
Godel's first incompleteness theorem says that in any axiomatic system (sufficiently complex) there are theorems that are neither always true nor always false. In other words, there is a theorem that is true for some model of the axioms but false for some other model of the axioms.
No.
Godel's completeness theorem can not be understood without bringing in first order logic, because it is a statement of the expressitivity of the language(relative to its semantics). Other more expressive languages, like second order logic (with its usual semantics) is not complete. Trying to explain Godel's completeness theorem without bringing in the language is a path to confusion.
And your explanation of the first incompleteness theorem is also at best confusing. I must preface this with the comment that your definition of a 'theorem' matches what is usually called a sentence or a statement, and a theorem is usually reserved for a sentence which is proven by a axiomatic system. If the axiomatic system is sound, all theorems will be true in all models. The question of completeness is whether or not all truths(aka sentences true in all models) can be proven(aka they are theorems). With this more common usage of the words, Gödel's incompleteness theorems show that every consistent theory containing the natural numbers has true statements on natural numbers that are not theorems of the theory (that is they cannot be proved inside the theory).
Your description of the first incompleteness theorem is also true for complete logics, even for propositional logic (with your definition of 'theorem' as actually meaning statement). It has statements which is true in some models and false in others. This does not make it incomplete.
That is interesting, I always thought that the incompleteness theorems says, there are theorems that are true or false in all models but cannot be proved to be so. But if it that is not the case and there always exist models where the theorem is true and false, that makes it sound to me, like the incompleteness theorem is not really about proving things. With that it sounds more like the inability of a sufficiently complex set of axioms to only admit isomorphic models, i.e. have all possible models agree on all expressible theorems. Makes the entire thing sound almost trivial, of course you can not prove what does not follow from the axioms.
Of all the incompleteness-style theorems, I find the Halting problem to be the most approachable and also the most interesting. Maybe it's because I'm a software dev that dabbles in math rather than the other way around. But that makes me wonder if all of Gödel's theorems can be stated if 'software form', so to speak.
Right, if you're a software engineer, the realization that the two theorems are nearly-equivalent really takes the air out of a lot of the existential philosophizing around Gödel's incompleteness.
Gödel's argument basically says that any system of mathematics powerful enough to implement basic arithmetic is a computer. This shouldn't be surprising to software engineers because the equivalency between Boolean logic and arithmetic is easy to show. And if you have a computer, you can build algorithms whose outcome can't be programmatically decided by other algorithms.
Also check out https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rice%27s_theorem
basically generalized the halting problem to arbitrary semantic properties.
It's convenient that Henry Rice lived long before the age of language cults. I don't even think Rice wrote software, he's just a mathematician, he proved this nice property in mathematics. Stuff like FORTRAN and ALGOL happens later.
Also though, just as for the Halting Problem, we are always allowed a three-way split. Rice proves that "Has property" vs "Does not have property" can't be done, but "Has property" vs "Does not have property" vs "Shrug - I dunno, seems hard" is possible, and indeed easy if you're OK with lots of machines landing in the "Shrug" pile. You can expend as much work as you like to shrink that pile, Rice just proved it would need infinite work to empty it completely.
Interesting points in here.
e.g. that Godel didn't think this scrapped Hilbert's project totally:
>Gödel believed that it was possible to redefine what we mean by a formal mathematical framework, or allow for alternative frameworks. He often discussed an infinite sequence of acceptable logical systems, each more powerful than the last. Every well-formulated mathematical question might be answerable within one of them.
That part you quoted was interesting to me too. I remember once re-reading the incompleteness theorems - where it talks about a "finite set of axioms", it seemed there may be a loophole if we can imagine a theoretically infinite set of axioms, as a way to approach completeness.
Overall I really enjoyed this article, short interviews with mathematicians and philosophers on a topic I've often thought about.
As far as I can see people always radically exaggerate the effect of the incompleteness theorems. It seems interesting that any nontrivial axiomatic system has statements which are true but unprovable but to say that derails Hilbert’s project seems just obviously untrue when you can for example join math postgrad programs now which are focused on formalisation. [1] So formalisation is very much still going on, probably more so now than ever given advances in theorem provers.
Yes there are undecidable statements (eg the continuum hypothesis) but that doesn’t change the fact that the vast vast majority of statements in any axiomatic system are going to be decidable, and most undecidable statements are going to have “niche” significance like that.
[1] eg https://www.imperial.ac.uk/study/courses/postgraduate-taught...
This is more like the popular lay take that are more or less confused about the meaning and implications of the theorems. The fact is that the implications are real yet more nuanced than this - something the article touched on.
Hilbert’s program was to reduce math to a finite set of axioms and was indeed derailed by incompleteness theorems(Gödel) and undecidability (Church, Turing).
Formalizing math with automated theorem provers has little to do with the goal of Hilbert program. Also they aren’t related to the foundational research that it entailed.
Also, as the article mentions, the implications as well as Gödel was largely misunderstood.
At the same time if you imagine a machine that can associate different maths. Would said machine encounter undecidable statements more frequently?
Would the rules of said machine have statements they themselves cannot prove by parameters set in their ‘programmed(by humans, machines, or other machines)’ assumptions?
Proof by contradiction requires finding a single contradiction. Practical utility just requires that contradiction be infrequent enough.
We really want to believe that we can understand everything, yet we know we cannot.
> “incompleteness theorems” established that no formal system of mathematics — no finite set of rules, or axioms, from which everything is supposed to follow — can ever be complete.'
There is usually a 'not sufficiently complex' clause in that definition. Presburger arithmetic is complete: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presburger_arithmetic
Right, you need to be able to construct numbers for Gödel's proof to apply.
Hilbert's incidence geometry, for instance, is consistent and complete. It's just rather small.
Is it releteble to Logic? I have heard that Economy is a subset of Logic, so is this theorem relatable to Economy?
It hints at something fundamental to how the universe works, in that there is always an adjacent possible.
I don’t think we’ll ever entirely know what they mean.
It may mean our brains are not currently equipped to understand the universe.