If you read the article up to the point where they describe the actual decision, it's quite different from the breathless outrage at the top. The reasoning is:
- In order to receive federal funds, state correctional institutions need to agree to certain standards, including the religious liberty protections.
- This agreement is between the federal government and the state institution; the prison guards and officials, in their personal capacity, never agreed to it.
- Therefore, the officials cannot be held liable in their personal capacity for violating the agreement.
- Notably, none of this shields the Louisiana Department of Corrections as an institution from legal liability.
Yep. Nor does it prevent states from passing laws putting individual liability on guards who so flagrantly violate inmate rights. It's just not something that the Feds can do.
Here’s the missing context. Congress has chosen to confer on prisoners certain freedom to practice their religion freely. For federal prisons, Congress can do this directly. But Congress cannot directly regulate the machinery of state government, so it can’t tell state prisons what to do, as the Supreme Court held in a 1997 case: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City_of_Boerne_v._Flores. Note a key point here is that these rights are statutory in nature, and go beyond the protection for religious liberty required by the constitution.
To work around that, Congress has imposed certain requirements as a condition of accepting federal prison funds. Among other things, it requires states to answer prisoner lawsuits for violations of these requirements. This is a common approach: Congress can’t directly regulate the states, but it can bribe them to agree to do things. But if the state doesn’t follow the conditions, then the only thing Congress can do is withdraw the money.
What this case holds is that the state’s consent to these lawsuits does not mean suits can be filed directly against prison guards who work for the state. This makes sense. A company might have a contract with another company that requires employees to follow various data security practices. The company might have rules requiring employees to follow data security practices. But if an employee doesn’t follow those practices, the other company can’t sue the employee directly. The employee isn’t a party to the contract. Similarly, the state may agree to certain requirements in return for federal funds. Prison guards may have to follow state policies to implement those requirements. But the prison guard is not a party to the contract between the state and federal government and cannot be sued for its breach.
As usual, the headline is hyperbolic and doesn't match the substance of the article, which is mostly correct.
RLUIPA governs the prison as an institution. The prison itself tacitly admits that the legal risk here was a matter of policy. As the article says:
In legal filings, Louisiana says it has
since “amended its prison grooming
policy” to ensure that nothing like
Landor’s “alleged experiences” happen
again.
So Landor has two options: (1) He can continue with his RLUIPA claim but against the prison; or (2) he can try a §1983 suit against the guards individually.
Option (1) is what he should have started with, and the fact that he didn't is indicative of bad legal advice for exactly the reason the Supreme Court explained: RLUIPA on its face clearly and textually only governs state institutions receiving federal funding, not individual employees in their personal capacities.
Option (2) is unlikely to prevail since there is probably no case law on point (most claims of this nature proceed under RLUIPA because it requires strict scrutiny of burdens on sincerely held religious belief, as opposed to the First Amendment analysis requiring mere rational basis for generally applicable state actions that incidentally burden religious free exercise).
So far, the three top-level comments by Georgelemental, rayiner, and torstenvl are all ignoring that the very definition of "government" as used in the relevant law [1] explicitly includes individual government officials [2]:
> (4)Government
> The term “government”—
> (A)means—
> (i)a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the authority of a State;
> (ii)any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause (i); and
> (iii)any other person acting under color of State law; and
> (B)for the purposes of sections 2000cc–2(b) and 2000cc–3 of this title, includes the United States, a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of the United States, and any other person acting under color of Federal law.
The section of the statute that defines judicial relief broadly provides [3]:
> (a)Cause of action
> A person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the Constitution.
If a violation by an individual government official counts as a violation by a "government", how could standing to obtain relief against a "government" not imply standing to obtain relief against the very individual government officials who committed the violation? Have the state officials not consented to receiving federal money through their wages? Nowhere in 42 U.S. Code § 2000cc through 42 U.S. Code § 2000cc-5 is there a mention of consent to be sued, and I could say that the prison guards consented to be sued by choosing employment at a prison that receives federal money! When a state "legalizes" marijuana, any state university receiving federal money must still ban students and staff from smoking marijuana.
TFA explicitly mentions Tanzin v. Tanvir, the Supreme Court case regarding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act which also defines "government" as including individual government officials. In Tanvir, Justice Thomas wrote the opinion (joined by all participating justices) ending with [4]:
> We conclude that RFRA’s express remedies provision permits litigants, when appropriate, to obtain money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities.
In Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, Justices Thomas, Roberts, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh now go the opposite way by ignoring the very sections of the statute that provide relief "against federal officials in their individual capacities". All six justices in the majority, including Justice Barrett, have chosen to "create a new policy-based presumption against damages against individual officials" even though five of them previously were "not at liberty to do so" [4].
>Landor experienced precisely the kind of harm that can only be remedied by money damages
I mean, if it's a violation of religious principle, and he's a Nazarite, his faith offers many forms of recompense, and none of them are monetary. His faith would say that those who have committed evil upon him will be met with similar or worse fates as assured by their God.
If you read the article up to the point where they describe the actual decision, it's quite different from the breathless outrage at the top. The reasoning is:
- In order to receive federal funds, state correctional institutions need to agree to certain standards, including the religious liberty protections.
- This agreement is between the federal government and the state institution; the prison guards and officials, in their personal capacity, never agreed to it.
- Therefore, the officials cannot be held liable in their personal capacity for violating the agreement.
- Notably, none of this shields the Louisiana Department of Corrections as an institution from legal liability.
The actual opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/23-1197_h3ci.pdf
Yep. Nor does it prevent states from passing laws putting individual liability on guards who so flagrantly violate inmate rights. It's just not something that the Feds can do.
The article gets six paragraphs in before starting to discuss the actual legal issue. No bueno! Better summary: https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/landor-v-louisiana-departme...
Here’s the missing context. Congress has chosen to confer on prisoners certain freedom to practice their religion freely. For federal prisons, Congress can do this directly. But Congress cannot directly regulate the machinery of state government, so it can’t tell state prisons what to do, as the Supreme Court held in a 1997 case: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City_of_Boerne_v._Flores. Note a key point here is that these rights are statutory in nature, and go beyond the protection for religious liberty required by the constitution.
To work around that, Congress has imposed certain requirements as a condition of accepting federal prison funds. Among other things, it requires states to answer prisoner lawsuits for violations of these requirements. This is a common approach: Congress can’t directly regulate the states, but it can bribe them to agree to do things. But if the state doesn’t follow the conditions, then the only thing Congress can do is withdraw the money.
What this case holds is that the state’s consent to these lawsuits does not mean suits can be filed directly against prison guards who work for the state. This makes sense. A company might have a contract with another company that requires employees to follow various data security practices. The company might have rules requiring employees to follow data security practices. But if an employee doesn’t follow those practices, the other company can’t sue the employee directly. The employee isn’t a party to the contract. Similarly, the state may agree to certain requirements in return for federal funds. Prison guards may have to follow state policies to implement those requirements. But the prison guard is not a party to the contract between the state and federal government and cannot be sued for its breach.
As usual, the headline is hyperbolic and doesn't match the substance of the article, which is mostly correct.
RLUIPA governs the prison as an institution. The prison itself tacitly admits that the legal risk here was a matter of policy. As the article says:
So Landor has two options: (1) He can continue with his RLUIPA claim but against the prison; or (2) he can try a §1983 suit against the guards individually.Option (1) is what he should have started with, and the fact that he didn't is indicative of bad legal advice for exactly the reason the Supreme Court explained: RLUIPA on its face clearly and textually only governs state institutions receiving federal funding, not individual employees in their personal capacities.
Option (2) is unlikely to prevail since there is probably no case law on point (most claims of this nature proceed under RLUIPA because it requires strict scrutiny of burdens on sincerely held religious belief, as opposed to the First Amendment analysis requiring mere rational basis for generally applicable state actions that incidentally burden religious free exercise).
The original title is:
> The Supreme Court Just Empowered Prison Guards to Violate Religious Rights With Impunity
So far, the three top-level comments by Georgelemental, rayiner, and torstenvl are all ignoring that the very definition of "government" as used in the relevant law [1] explicitly includes individual government officials [2]:
> (4)Government
> The term “government”—
> (A)means—
> (i)a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the authority of a State;
> (ii)any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause (i); and
> (iii)any other person acting under color of State law; and
> (B)for the purposes of sections 2000cc–2(b) and 2000cc–3 of this title, includes the United States, a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of the United States, and any other person acting under color of Federal law.
The section of the statute that defines judicial relief broadly provides [3]:
> (a)Cause of action
> A person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the Constitution.
If a violation by an individual government official counts as a violation by a "government", how could standing to obtain relief against a "government" not imply standing to obtain relief against the very individual government officials who committed the violation? Have the state officials not consented to receiving federal money through their wages? Nowhere in 42 U.S. Code § 2000cc through 42 U.S. Code § 2000cc-5 is there a mention of consent to be sued, and I could say that the prison guards consented to be sued by choosing employment at a prison that receives federal money! When a state "legalizes" marijuana, any state university receiving federal money must still ban students and staff from smoking marijuana.
TFA explicitly mentions Tanzin v. Tanvir, the Supreme Court case regarding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act which also defines "government" as including individual government officials. In Tanvir, Justice Thomas wrote the opinion (joined by all participating justices) ending with [4]:
> We conclude that RFRA’s express remedies provision permits litigants, when appropriate, to obtain money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities.
In Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections and Public Safety, Justices Thomas, Roberts, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh now go the opposite way by ignoring the very sections of the statute that provide relief "against federal officials in their individual capacities". All six justices in the majority, including Justice Barrett, have chosen to "create a new policy-based presumption against damages against individual officials" even though five of them previously were "not at liberty to do so" [4].
[1] https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2000cc
[2] https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2000cc-5
[3] https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2000cc-2
[4] https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/592/19-71/
>Landor experienced precisely the kind of harm that can only be remedied by money damages
I mean, if it's a violation of religious principle, and he's a Nazarite, his faith offers many forms of recompense, and none of them are monetary. His faith would say that those who have committed evil upon him will be met with similar or worse fates as assured by their God.